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ASPECTS OF MODERN PESSIMISM 
These essays represent four chapters of a projected 
work on the Problem of Evil in Modern Pessimism. In  
this work the author undertakes an examination of the 
various philosophies of negation and despair-logical, 2s- 
thetic, social, moral, religious-regarding them as inverted 
theories of value. T h e  pessimist condemns and despairs 
of the world for reasons which may be just as enlightening 
to  the searcher af ter  the values of life as the reasons which 
lead his neighbor to  trust in man’s immortal destiny. T h e  
idea of immortality is the peak of man’s hope; the problem 
of eqil, the pitfall before his feet:  between dismay and 
hope stretches the life-path of man. On this path three 
travellers-a saint, a singer, and a sage-are observed 
here, seeking light in the twilight that  engulfs our mortal 
career. 
I 
PASCAL’S DESPAIR OF REASON 
I 
N the knowledge of truth is man’s hope of freedom, I and our whole dignity and worth is in our thought; yet 
thought is also the first source of our misery; it yokes us 
t o  plough in the marshes of doubt. H e  that  increaseth 
knowledge increaseth sorrow, sighed Ecclesiastes, and the 
primitive wisdom of Israel had already passed judgment on 
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intelligence in the old story of the Fall of Man.  Wha t  
banished Adam and Eve from Paradise? Eating of the 
Tree  of Knowledge of good and evil. Profoundly sig- 
nificant is this Hebrew recognition that man’s first woes 
were due to  his inability to  check his inquiring turn of mind. 
Dove, lamb, and sheep remained blissfully in Eden;  they 
had not been moved to  eat  of the Tree  of Knowledge. 
Whether it be owing to  our intelligence, or to  our insuf- 
ficiency of it, many of us pass f rom pious innocence in 
childhood to  unsettled unbelieving youth, and to  half- 
believing or indifferent gray maturity, often wistfully recall- 
ing the green days of whole-hearted, joyous trust. I t  was 
not by this road that,  in his brief span of thirty-nine years, 
Blaise Pascal reached the evening twilight of defiant faith 
and finality. H i s  mind’s history had proceeded on an 
entirely unconventional schedule, H o w  amazingly uncon- 
ventional, let Chateaubriand tell us in his Ge‘nie du 
Claristianisme : 
“There was a man who a t  the age of twelve, with bars 
and rilzgs, created mathematics; who a t  sixteen wrote the 
most learned treatise on conic sections produced since an- 
tiquity; who a t  nineteen reduced to  a machine a science 
existing wholly in the understanding; who a t  twenty-three 
demonstrated the phenomena of air-pressure and destroyed 
one of the great errors of ancient physics; who a t  this age 
when other men are  barely born, having covered the round 
of human knowledge, perceived its nothingness and turned 
his thoughts to  religion; who from that  moment until his 
death, in his thirty-ninth year, sick and suffering all the 
time, fixed the language spoken by Bossuet and Racine, 
gave the model of the most perfect pleasantry and of the 
most vigorous reasoning; who finally, in the brief intervals 
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between his ills, solved abstractly one of the highest prob- 
lems of geometry and jotted on paper thoughts which 
partake as  much of the Divine as of the human: this terrible 
genius was called Blaise Pascal.” 
T h e  early training of this amazing mind was calculated 
least of all to  encourage sceptical tendencies, but rather 
t o  develop the self-assurance of the intellect. Rtienne Pas- 
cal, himself a savant and mathematician of note, made the 
education of his son Blaise his main concern in life, and 
his deliberate aim was consistently to keep the youth above 
and ahead of his task. T h e  boy should undertake no 
problem likely to  overtax or baffle his abilities. This  was 
to  be QO overfed infant prodigy: he was not t o  study Latin 
or  Greek until he was twelve, nor mathematics before 
fifteen. H i s  whole education was intended progressively to  
lead him, self-assured and confident in the powers of his 
mind, to  more and more difficult problems. This  compla- 
cent gait Blaise would not follow; learning that geometry 
had to  do  with lines and circles, bars and rings, he re- 
invented Euclid a t  the age of twelve, wrecked his father’s 
pedagogy, and joined the elder Pascal’s own scientific 
society. 
I n  this very early and vigorous mental life, religion 
seems to  have played no part. T h e  father was no free- 
thinker, nor the family as a whole in any way lax; but while 
altogether conformist and reverent, IEtienne Pascal kept 
his faith and his science on genial neighborly terms. T o  
the young mathematical genius, religion came incidentally 
and, as it were, in its place: it did not dominate his daily 
life, as it did not disturb overmuch that  of his father. It 
was later in his youth, a t  an age when vigilant minds begin 
to  worry lest they lose their faith, that  Pascal first really 
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found faith as a dominant force in his own life. T h e  
Pascals were then living in Rouen, where the father was a 
high official. I n  January, 1646, while on his way to  stop a 
duel, Gtienne Pascal slipped on the ice and fractured a leg. 
T h e  two medicos who attended him must have been versed 
in curing both soul and body, for by the time the broken 
limb was healed, the entire Pascal family was converted to  
the intense Augustinian Catholicism which Cornelius Jan- 
senius, bishop of Ypres, had championed and of which the 
Abbey of Por t  Royal, under the guidance of St. Cyran, was 
the living heart. 
If heretofore science and worldliness had marked the 
life of the Pascals, henceforth devotion to  God and his 
grace are  to  claim them all :  father, son, two daughters. 
From this time forth the debutante Jacqueline was bound 
for  the cloister; her married sister Gilberte was to  live a 
life of the most rigorous piety; the father’s closing years 
were aglow with Jansenist enthusiasm. T h e  intensity of 
Blaise Pascal’s devotion fluctuated, but if there were lapses 
of worldliness, the return was to  a piety doubly profound. 
One does Pascal an injustice in attributing his religiosity 
to  his ill health. I11 health and the compulsory relaxation 
ordered by his physicians sent him into the gay life of 
society, but he turned from it t o  experience a second con- 
version, soul-consuming and irrevocable. From that Mon- 
day night in November, 1654, until his death in 1662, 
Pascal was first and last a warrior for the faith. 
But the citadel which he defended was a citadel besieged : 
Jansenism was under the cloud of heresy. T h e  invalid 
genius whose youth had written new chapters in the history 
of science was now destined to  write masterpieces of relig- 
ious controversy, the L e t t r e s  Prov inc ia les  in which he 
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champions St. Augustine and Port  Royal against the casu- 
istry of the Jesuits. 
T h e  main issue between Jensenist and Jesuit is all-im- 
portant:  it concerns the doctrine of grace and the salvation 
of man. Does man’s free-will contribute to  his own salva- 
tion; is salvation in any sense whatever earned by man or 
is it altogether a free gift of G o d ?  This  problem is not 
exclusively Christian. T h e  Hindu observes a little kitten 
in dire peril; the mother cat seizes it by the nape of the 
neck and carries it, limp and helpless, t o  safety. But see 
the baby monkey similarly snatched away from danger: the 
old monkey does her best for it, but the little one also 
scrambles away for all it is worth. Which of these two is 
the better analogy of man’s salvation by God?  Hindu 
theologians argued ardently over the cat-hold and the mon- 
key-hold theory. 
T h e  first essential of a religion of salvation is the re- 
cognition of the utter sinfulness of man;  attenuate or  explain 
away the actuality of evil, says the orthodox theologian, 
and the religion of Christ, the Saviour of men, is no more. 
T h e  whole scheme of salvation implies man’s dire need of it. 
If man can save himself, what need of the Redeemer? 
So man cannot save himself because he is born in sin. Sal- 
vation then is a free gift of God to  man, a gift which God 
does not owe to  anyone. Shall we add:  a gift which 
God does not grant t o  all? Unless we do, hell is likely 
to  lose its salutary terrors;  i f  we do add it, we open the 
door to  a pack of vicious problems. H e r e  the Church 
has traditionally leaned on St. Augustine’s doctrine of 
grace, against the dualistic heresy of the Manichean which 
treats evil as coeval and coordinate with good, and like- 
wise against the Pelagian heresy which is ambiguous and 
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negligent of the fatal  reality of evil, and which regards 
man as actively contributing to  his own salvation. 
St. Augustine’s position is presumably orthodox; but 
what is the true Augustinian doctrine? Surely, we are told, 
it is not the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. Accord- 
ing to  Calvin, as Catholics understood him, man, tainted 
from birth with original sin, is bound for hell everlasting. 
But some men God predestines to  salvation. A soul thus 
elected to  grace is saved, justified, and sanctified by the 
free gift of God. God, then, predestines some men to  
heaven, others t o  hell, without any prevision of their sins 
and irrespective of repentance or merit on their part. 
Against Calvinism uprise the followers of Molina, a 
Spanish Jesuit who, in 1588, espoused a doctrine of salva- 
tion decidedly Pelagian : God has conditionally willed to  
save all, but upon man’s actually availing himself of this 
sufficing grace freely bestowed by the Redeemer, depends 
the effectiveness of the grace to  save. And even when the 
saving grace is withdrawn, man still retains the power to  
reach after and regain it. This  Jesuit view was abhorrent 
to  Pascal: it rejected St. Augustine’s truth along with Cal- 
vin’s heresy. Whereas Calvin makes God’s will the abso- 
lute author alike of man’s salvation and of his damnation, 
the Jesuit doctrine makes both proceed essentially from the 
will of man. 
A third position is that of the Dominicans, followers of 
St. Thomas. If all men are burdened with sin, all are ac- 
corded the gift of grace through Christ’s death. This  grace 
does not save and sanctify man, but it does open our eyes to 
see good and evil, it makes us capable of choosing the one 
o r  the other. But while our rejection of this gift of God 
will damn us, our acceptance of the gift is not sufficient 
for salvation. For saintliness and eternal bliss, God gives 
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t o  the elect souls a second grace, free, irresistible, grace 
efficace. So long as God thus sustains the soul of the 
elect, it is saintly. Should the hand of God be withdrawn, 
there remains to  the soul a power strong enough to  fulfill 
God’s commandments, but not strong enough to  save. 
T h e  fourth doctrine of grace is the doctrine of St. Augus- 
tine as interpreted by the Jansenists. It is the doctrine 
defended by Pascal. Adam’s free choice of evil has tainted 
all mankind with original sin, and God could with perfect 
justice have damned us every one. But in his all pure and 
free mercy God has elected some to  grace. T o  some the 
grace of God has not been accorded a t  all ;  others God has 
willed to  redeem and has given them grace which would 
have led them t o  heaven had they also been given the 
singular grace of perseverance, without which one cannot 
attain unto saintliness; t o  still others, blessed souls, God 
has accorded grace certain and infallible. Le t  each man 
believe, but believe with trembling, that  he is among the 
elect, let him not judge that anyone, be he the most evil 
and impious, is among the damned, so long as one breath 
of life remains. Man’s free-will brought evil into the 
world; God wills the damnation of the wicked conditionally 
and by prevision; the salvation of the elect souls God wills 
absolutely. 
A dispute among theologians is apt  t o  become arid and 
abstruse. Back of this trio of Catholic doctrines-Molin- 
ist, Neo-Thomist, Jansenist-we find two heresies in con- 
flict: on the one hand, the heresy of pagan self-reliance, 
Pelagianism: man in a measure saves himself and receives 
grace as he deserves i t ;  on the other hand the heresy of 
fatalist predestination, which casts aside human will and 
responsibility as of no avail whatever, and regards Jesus 
Christ as having died not for  all, but only for  the elect. 
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There  is covert Pelagianism in the doctrine of Molina; 
the Dominicans attacked it a t  Rome, and only a papal 
interdict of discussion prevented a cleavage. I t  is against 
this Neo-Pelagianism of the Jesuits that  Bishop Jansenius 
of Ypres wrote his learned folio Augustinus; and it was 
only natural that  the Jesuits should reply by charging the 
Jansenists of Por t  Royal with Calvinist fatalism. T h e  
Provinciales exhibit with consummate irony the unstable 
dubious position of the Dominican followers of St. Thomas 
in this conflict. In  more substantial agreement with Jan- 
senius than with Molina, they were yet in verbal agree- 
ment with the latter, owing perhaps to  the Jesuit dexterous 
manipulation of traditional formulas of orthodoxy. T o  
open the eyes of the Thomists t o  the real beneath the 
verbal issue and to  win them to the support of Jansenist 
Augustinianism and so prevent the threatened anathema, 
was Arnauld’s hope; it was also Pascal’s immediate object 
in writing the Provinciales. 
From this immediate issue over the doctrine of grace, 
Pascal is led to  attack the Jesuits on a larger front. T h e  
self-reliance of the Molinist view of salvation is typical of 
the laxity and worldliness of Jesuit morality. Leaning 
on the learning of Arnauld and Nicole, and seasoning the 
intensity and severity of Por t  Royal with supreme contro- 
versial wit, Pascal lays bare, in a series of immortal letters, 
the unchristian compromise of the Jesuit with the powers 
of evil, Jesuit complacence, Jesuit pride and arrogance, 
Jesuit diplomacy and duplicity, Jesuit worldliness. Against 
Escobar’s twenty-four new-fashioned church fathers, Pascal 
pleads for  the old Augustinian faith, a faith from the world 
apart, a faith humble, vigilant, fearful-relying never on 
self, but ever leaning on God and Christ. 
T h e  Provinciales did not accomplish their immediate aim : 
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the Dominicans did not turn from Molina to  Jansenius, 
and Por t  Royal was condemned, for,  as Pascal grimly 
observed, it was easier t o  bring more monks to  vote against 
Por t  Royal than to bring arguments against it. But the 
brilliant attack on Jesuit unchristian laxity dealt the society 
of Loyola a blow from which it never recovered: as Sainte- 
Beuve observes, Pascal destroyed forever Jesuit dominance 
in the government of the world. 
I have not taken this time to  discuss the Jansenist contro- 
versies of Pascal simply owing to  the dialectic lure of 
the Provinciales, though that itself were reason enough. 
T h e  Provinciales are  in a sense propadeutic to  the Pense‘es. 
Against Molina’s Pelagianism, Pascal was defending the 
Augustinian Christianity of Jansenius ; but what real assur- 
ance did he have that  any of these second and third-hand 
alleged versions of the truth were themselves t rue? W a s  he 
right about Jansenius, or Jansenius about Augustine, o r  
Augustine about Christianity, and what certainty availed 
of the truth of Christianity itself? T h e  Jesuit could well 
lean back in his chair and quote his twenty-four doctors, 
himself being the twenty-fifth as occasion demanded. T h e  
Jesuit was not wedded to  truth, he distinctly abdicated ver- 
ity for probability. Would Pascal quote St. Augustine, St. 
Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome? T h e  Jesuit father 
had Escobar’s armory : Fernandez, Martinez,  Suarez, Hen-  
riquez, Vasquez, Lopez, Gomez, Sanchez, and twice as 
many more. They didn’t agree with each other, but what 
of i t ?  If you would murder, here is Lessius to  suit you; 
if not, there stands Vasquez on your side. One needs many 
guides if one plans to  travel many roads. But Pascal would 
travel the one single road of truth, truth absolute and 
incontrovertible. Probabilism and casuistry he found intel- 
lectually intolerable and morally detestable. It is not 
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merely that Escobar’s twenty-four doctors contradict each 
other ;  i f  he maintains against them all the cause of Augus- 
tine, Pascal is not simply pitting authority against author- 
ity, one lion against twenty-four asses. Pascal is not essen- 
tially a dogmatic theologian, and mere authority counts 
with him nothing a t  all. H i s  orthodoxy is the orthodoxy 
of truth, not the orthodoxy of papal bulls. Nor  is he over- 
whelmed by numbers or by power. T o  the Jesuit fathers 
he declares nobly in the closing words of the Twelfth Pro- 
vinciale: “You believe you have force and impunity on your 
side; but on my side I believe I have truth and innocence 
. . . Tru th  lasts forever and triumphs over its enemies, for  
it is eternal and mighty like God himself”. 
On questions of fact he would not submit t o  Rome, 
and one is moved to  think that on questions of faith also 
he is ready to  look beyond the Sorbonne and the Vatican. 
Pascal’s early life had not been devoted in vain to  scientific 
work: fact is fact for him, and truth, truth. H e  does not 
need Innocent the Tenth or  the Seventh Alexander to  tell 
him whether a certain doctrine is or is not to  be found in the 
folio of Bishop Jansenius. H e  would repeat Galileo’s 
words to  the Inquisition, which had extracted a recantation 
from him regarding the movement of the ear th:  E pur se 
muove! Whether the earth moves or stands still is a 
question of fact, not of papal pronouncement. H e  would 
not turn from Arnauld to  Escobar, o r  from Augustine to  
Molina simply because a Pope in Rome decrees that he 
do so. “If my letters are  condemned in Rome,’’ he writes, 
“that which I condemn in them is condemned in heaven.” 
Beyond the Sorbonne and the Inquisition and the Vatican, 
he looks to  the eternal source and ground of all truth. 
“Lord Jesus, I appeal to your tribunal!’’ 
This, then, is the thorny problem which confronted the 
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author of the Pense‘cs. Unlike the Jesuit Sophists, he be- 
lieves that knowledge is more than opinion, and truth than 
mere probability. A grab-bag of authorities would not d o  for 
him; nor would he pin his faith blindly on anyone’s author- 
ity. Behind the authority he would go  to  test its basis. H e  
believes there is truth to  be had;  he has the test of it and 
would know if he had i t ;  but he despairs of ever attaining 
it with his intellect. H e r e  we perceive Pascal’s scepticism, 
and also its limits. Behold this sick, suffering genius, 
wracked by a thousand pains: what made him so discon- 
tented in his science, what made him so unsettlingly intense 
in his faith? 
W e  have now come to  a book of fragments, notes- 
jotted down or dictated by Pascal in intervals between in- 
tense suffering-the whole forming a manuscript almost il- 
legible and chaotic in its original state, a book nevertheless 
so soul-searching and soul-revealing that great minds do not 
know whether t o  be glad that it was never finished and 
polished off, or to  wonder what amazing masterpiece it 
would have been had Pascal lived long enough to  complete 
his work; a book beside which one puts the Imitation o f  
Christ and St. Augustine’s Confessions, and which French 
scholars would save and cherish above all other French 
books. This  masterpiece is the Pense‘es (the Thoughts)  
of Blaise Pascal. 
I1 
I t  is not for others only that Pascal planned his great 
Apology, of which only the random fragments are to  be 
found in the book before us. H e  planned the Apology for 
himself first of all. T h e  book was to  contain letters, dia- 
logues, eloquence, argument. W h o  can tell whether this 
sceptical passage or that infidel fragment express Pascal’s 
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own views or the views which, in a contemplated dialogue, he 
intended to  combat? So Strowski warns us: imagine the 
Provinciales in the uncompleted state in which we find the 
Pense‘es. They would have been equally contradictory: a 
chaos of Jesuit tirades, Jansenist pleas, Pascalian dialectic. 
But there, as here, the problems would have remained the 
same. I n  the Pense‘es Pascal has argued the case for  faith, 
but he has also argued the case for  doubt: we have them 
both side by side, and the contrast is eloquent. 
Fo r  such knowledge as is vouchsafed t o  man Pascal 
relies on the method of geometry. I t  consists, according 
to him, in defining all our terms and proving all our propo- 
sitions. Now, if we go from involved and complex terms 
back to  plainer and simpler terms we are  led a t  last t o  
primitive words that do not admit of definition. Similarly, 
if we trace a certain proposition to  the propositions on 
which it rests for its proof, and these in turn to  further 
and further prior propositions, we finally reach first prin- 
ciples and axioms which are  undemonstrable. T h e  geo- 
metrical method is thus perfectly certain so far  as it goes, 
but inadequate and unconvincing in the end since it does not 
go far  enough. Man,  naturally helpless, sooner or later 
comes against a wall which he cannot surmount. This  
subtly precise game of science, in which the intellect manip- 
ulates its stock of concepts, affords Pascal no final satis- 
faction: what it proves it proves well, but it does not prove 
what Pascal, what in fact all thinking men want proved 
and assured-the ultimates of life and existence. So Pascal 
writes t o  Fermat,  whom he calls the greatest geometer of 
Europe: “ T o  speak frankly about geometry, I regard it as 
the highest exercise of the mind, but a t  the same time I 
know it t o  be so unavailing that I see little difference 
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between a man who is merely a geometer and a skillful 
artisan.” 
On the gates of his 
Academy Plato had inscribed the words: “Let no ungeo- 
metrical person enter here”. Science demands the precise 
definition and demonstration of which geometry is the 
model. But for  true wisdom, for  an adequate philosophy 
of life, one has to  be more than merely a geometer, content 
to  begin with a first page of axioms and definitions. One 
must challenge the meaning of number, motion, space, time, 
yes, and also of Being, Nature,  world, life, thought, value, 
truth, beauty, good, God. T h e  man who could perceive 
and express this truth as Pascal perceived and expressed it 
may not give us the final philosophy of life, but he would 
die trying to  attain it. 
New troubles beset us now. If geometry is precise but 
not final, philosophy is neither final nor precise. Here  is 
human thought overreaching itself in its effort t o  compre- 
hend the universe, God and man, and falling fa r  short of 
its goal, confused and inconclusive. H o w  can you measure 
infinity with a yardstick? Suppose you climb to  the top 
of  M t .  Cenis, Montaigne wrote:  are  you really any nearer 
the sky than you would be a t  the bottom of the sea?  Sup- 
pose, disdaining geometry, you attempt philosophy : are 
you any nearer final t ruth? Only your footing is less 
secure. “For  what, af ter  all, is man in nature? With  
regard to  the infinite, he is nothing; with regard to  nothing, 
he is all :  a mean between nothing and all. Infinitely fa r  
f rom comprehending the ultimate, the end of things and 
their first principles are hidden from him in impenetrable 
mystery-equally incapable of seeing the nothing from 
which he issues and the infinite in which he is submerged.” 
W h a t  are  we to do, then? Shall we go with the men of 
Let  not the last phrase escape us. 
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the world, such as Mhrd, whose wit exceeds their intellectual 
supply o r  demand, and who, as Leibnitz tells us, set little 
value on what they do  not understand? Or shall we more 
eloquently shrug our shoulders with Montaigne and, ignor- 
ing out duty to  seek the truth, cheerily resign ourselves to  
our inability to find it? Pascal knew his Montaigne, every 
line and word, but he could not sink into the faint-hearted 
easy indolence of the Essais. T h e  motto of Montaigne, 
Que scais-je?” recalls Pilate’s shrug : “Wha t  is truth ?” 
Such disdain discloses the unheroic soul. As keenly as Mon- 
taigne, Pascal recognized the pitiful limits of our knowledge, 
but t o  him this was no occasion for idle acquiescence. I t  
is, in fact, the tragedy of his spirit. H e  feels as if he is 
ever on the brink of an abyss : the abyss of the all-important 
unknown. 
Pascal considered another philosophical alternative : the 
Stoic wisdom of Epictetus. Behold a sage who knows 
nothing of man’s essential ignorance, knowing only man’s 
duty. But his severity, noble dignity and fortitude, are 
they not in the end just pride, vain and futile? 
There  are Stoic moments in Pascal, and in him as in all 
of us, so Sainte-Beuve reminds us, there is not a little of 
Montaigne. But neither Montaigne’s acquiescence nor 
the pathetic dignity of Epictetus can satisfy him. More  
intently and unflinchingly he would face man’s plight and 
seek a way out. W e  move on a narrow strip of knowledge 
between two oceans of ignorance. No t  one law but has its 
counter law, not one truth but turns out to  be also false. 
M a n  treads no path that does not turn upon itself, t o  
bring him back to  the uncertainty with which he began. 
Real truth must be eternal, the same in Toulouse and in 
Paris;  but what of our truths and our justice? If you lived 
on this side of the river, it  would be murder for me to  
(( 
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kill you, my fellow. But you live on the other side of 
the river: in killing you, I am no  assassin, but a brave son 
of my country. “A meridian settles the truth. . . . Tru th  
this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.” Is 
our virtue an eternal value, or is it of this life only? W e  
shrug our shoulders regarding the hereafter;  yet how can 
we doubt that  whether we be mortal o r  immortal makes all 
the difference in morals? Equally halting and inconclusive 
is our thought on all ultimate questions. “Incomprehen- 
sible that God exists, and incomprehensible that H e  does 
not exist; that  the soul is in the body, and that we have no 
soul; that  the world is or is not created, that  there is or 
isn’t original sin.” 
Is the field abandoned, then, in possession of the sceptic? 
Pascal cannot banish doubt, yet he cannot endure its with- 
ering effect. T h e  notion of infinity overwhelms him. Kant 
was stirred to  noble ardor by the sight of the celestial 
spaces; Pascal found their eternal silence harrowing : 
“When I consider the short span of my life, absorbed in 
the eternity before and after,  the small space that  I fill 
and even that  I see, engulfed in the infinite immensity, of 
spaces which I know not and which know me not, I am 
dismayed and amazed to  find myself here rather than there;  
for  there is no reason whatever why here rather than there, 
why now rather than some other time. W h o  has put me 
here? By whose order and direction has this place and 
time been destined to  me?” 
W e  are  moving, faster than appears, t o  the climax of 
this drama of the spirit. Thought  insists on scaling the 
Infinite, and cannot scale it. Here  is man’s misery and 
here also man’s grandeur, and here must we seek the way 
out. W e  read in Lkvy-Bruhl: “Man  cannot be incurably 
helpless, as Montaigne says, and a t  the same time have 
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duties imposed upon him such as are  pointed out by Epic- 
tetus.” Yet as fa r  as thought goes they are  both right. 
Reason cannot remove this contradiction: we must rise to a 
higher point of view i f  the fuller truth is to  be revealed. 
There  is a hierarchy of orders, Pascal declares; from 
the lower to  the higher is always an amazing leap. There 
is a material order, there is a mental order, there is an 
order of values-Pascal calls it charite‘. Just as all the 
length in the world will not give us breadth, nor all 
the length and breadth together give us depth, so no amount 
of matter,  bodies, firmaments, stars and earths, can yield or 
are worth one little mind or  thought. Mind, thought, is 
another, a higher order of reality. And so, in turn, the 
whole universe of matter and mind will not of itself yield 
one act of true charity, one moment of worth. Charity, 
value, again, is another, a higher order of reality. 
Here  is thought enmeshed in contrarieties. Wha t  will 
resolve the dilemmas of scepticism? A higher court than 
the court of’reason:  from the order of thought we must 
rise to  the order of charite‘, of value. Pascal’s tactics here 
suggest the Hegelian, but his road is that  of the mystic. 
On the night of November twenty-third, 1654, the night 
of his second conversion, Pascal did not reason, did not 
have to  reason; he saw face to  face, saw with a higher 
vision a higher light. Behold the truth of Montaigne and 
the truth of Epictetus: these two contrary truths a re  one 
in the truth of Christ. I n  Christ’s Gospel the misery and 
the grandeur of man are  made truly one: the child of sin 
is the child of God. T o  perceive this truth, more than 
reason is required: this last wisdom, just as all ultimate 
truths and all first principles, can be known only by the 
heart. This  indeed is the wisdom of all knowledge, t o  rec- 
ognize its limits. There  is nothing more reasonable than 
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this disavowal of reason, the submission to  feeling. “The  
heart  has it reasons, which reason does not know a t  all. 
. , . It is the heart  which perceives God, and not reason. 
This  is faith:  God made evident t o  the heart, not t o  rea- 
son.” You may ask love to  justify itself, to  state its 
grounds. Th i s  it does: a catalogue of halting reasons, so 
many nothings, but the heart  somehow transfuses these 
nothings into one ardent reality. 
I11 
In  order t o  possess the great truths of religion, how do 
we rise from the order of thought t o  the order of charity, 
f rom reason to  the heart, f rom knowledge to  faith? In- 
spiration is the perfect pa th ;  God in his grace must speak 
to man. The re  are humbler approaches, however: reason 
and custom may serve us here. If they cannot establish 
our faith, they may yet help to remove obstacles t o  it, may 
prepare the way. 
But how are  we to  prove God’s existence? “If there is a 
God, H e  is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having no parts 
nor limits, H e  is out of touch with us. W e  are  thus inca- 
pable of knowing what H e  is, o r  whether H e  exists. Accord- 
ingly, who would dare to  undertake the solution of this 
question? No t  we, we are  out of touch with H i m  alto- 
gether.” T h e  Christian who believes without pretending 
to  prove his faith is after all right, for  how are any proofs 
possible here? “God exists, o r  H e  does not exist. Now, 
to  which side shall we incline? Reason can settle nothing 
here: an infinite chaos is in our way. A game is being 
played, a t  the end of this infinite distance, which will come 
out heads or tails. W h a t  will you wager? By reason you 
can make neither the one nor the other;  by reason you can 
support neither side.” 
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W e  have come now to  the famous wager of Pascal, 
which has occasioned endless controversy. Is this a dia- 
logue with an unbeliever, o r  is Pascal disputing God’s 
existence with himself? Certain it seems that i f  knowledge 
about God is beyond the reach of our reason, then the 
recognition of its helplessness is the only reasonable course 
open to  reason, and agnosticism the true wisdom. Does 
God exist o r  no t?  I do not know ; I cannot say ; how then 
can I wager? “The right thing is not to  wager a t  all.” 
But this agnostic withdrawal from the wager of eternity, 
is it not in effect itself a wager? T o  act so as to  ignore the 
issue whether God exists or  not, is virtually to  deny God’s 
existence. This  is, indeed, the most reckless of choices: 
to  move blandly in the face of possible eternal ruin. Theo- 
retically Pascal’s reason counselled sceptical inaction, but 
he found the agnostic practice intolerable. If we were to  
wait upon certainty before acting, could we act a t  al l? 
W e  must act to-day in preparation for to-morrow, although 
we may never see the morrow. Every step we take is a 
step in the dark. Whether  we march or whether we stand 
still we are  invariably gambling on the uncertain. I t  be- 
hooves us t o  use our poor reason in determining the nature 
of the hazards we run in this world of uncertainties. 
God exists, o r  God does not exist,-and by God’s exist- 
ence Pascal understands here the whole of the Christian 
religion,-God exists or God does not exist. This  is of all 
issues the most solemn and fatal ;  it imposes itself on you; 
you cannot shirk i t ;  willy-nilly, Pascal says, you must wager 
il faut parier. On which side will you stake your life, your 
soul? Since you must choose, let us see on which side your 
interest lies. Whether you choose the one or the other is, as 
far  as reason goes, indifferent, f o r  there is no reason either 
way. But what about your fortune, your beatitude o r  your 
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irretrievable ruin? Either there is a God, perfect good- 
ness and wisdom and power, and this world-course is a 
solemn drama of Divine Providence governing all destiny ; 
or else there is no God, and this world is a vast machine 
of matter-in-motion, or else immense and irremediable 
chaos. Either there is a God, and your life and death 
are but the prelude to  an eternal career of bliss o r  damna- 
tion; o r  there is no God, and your lot  is as the lot of all 
other clods of moist earth. W h a t  have you to gain, and 
what to  lose, if you choose one way or  the other, heads 
or tails? Suppose you live your life as if God existed: 
you may, of course, miss the so-called pleasures of this 
brief life, but, again, you may gain an eternity of heaven. 
On  the other hand, live your life as if  there were no God:  
you may then have your sinful way here and now, and then 
death and nothing more; but, my soul, it is also possible 
that you may face eternal damnation. Staked against pos- 
sible heaven and hell, what are the pleasures of this life 
worth? Nothing a t  all. The  infinite is staked against the 
finite, to-day and to-morow against eternity. H o w  can you 
then hesitate about your choice? Choose for  God:  you thus 
insure yourself against the hazard of damnation, you stake 
your brief life on the chance of eternal bliss. Even if 
there were only one chance that  God exists and ten thousand 
chances that there is no God, still the infinite disparity be- 
tween the hazards involved would warrant your staking 
your life on God’s existence. 
Behold Pascal’s immortal wager. But the soul of man 
replies: be it as you say; all the same, you are  forcing 
me to  yield my life against my will. T h e  fact is, I am 
so made that I cannot believe in God. Will  you damn me 
for  my inability? Wha t  am I to  d o ?  Even i f  my reason 
accedes, my heart resists the call of faith. 
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True, Pascal answers: i f  reason cannot help you here, 
habit and custom shall. Your heart is resistant because it 
is wedded to  passion, t o  the lusts of this world. Break 
down the resistance to  faith, curb your passions. You can- 
not believe? Enter anyhow upon the path of the believer, 
do as he does, act as i f  you were a believer, go to  mass, 
take holy water. “This will make you believe and will 
stultify you, cela vous ab2tira”. T h e  word is terrible; we 
shudder as it comes from Pascal’s lips and we dare not 
look a t  him lest we see on his face the ironic grin of the 
mocking unbeliever. Por t  Royal could not bear, or did 
not dare, t o  print this word. But there is no grin of mock- 
ery on Pascal’s lips: terrible exhorter though he be, he 
never loses sight of the other side. T o  the unbeliever 
such artificial acquiescence seems debasing stultification. 
Mechanically to  go through the motions of a ritual, t o  
drug and stupefy myself into alien piety: “This is just what 
I fear,” the soul protests. “And why?” Pascal replies: 
“Wha t  have you to lose?” Eternity is at stake for you, 
and you are worrying over your sorry dignity and self- 
respect. Your supreme interest counsels the wager : close 
your eyes and plunge forward, blindly if need be : habit will 
sweep aside the obstacles in your way, while you wait for 
the grace of God to  illumine you with the higher light, t o  
humble and transfigure and exalt you all a t  once. 
IV 
Pascal is one of the most defiant warriors for the Chris- 
tian faith;  but his wager has proved a precarious bulwark 
to  orthodoxky. Orthodoxy demands a different sort of 
assurance. Different is the assurance of St. Paul: “I know 
whom I have believed, and a m  persuaded that he is able 
to keep that which I have committed unto him against that 
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day.” H e r e  is straightforward unquestioning trust. Now 
a certain type of believer demands for the voyage of his 
spirit, not only the full-blown sails of faith, but also the 
rudder and compass of understanding. Believe, without 
understanding i f  you must, Clement of Alexandria would 
say, but if you believe with understanding, all the better. 
T o  the simple assent of faith the gnosis of Christian intel- 
ligence is as the man full grown to the infant. This  is 
the great confidence in the intellect which distinguishes the 
best of Scholastic thought, particularly the great succession 
of Dominican philosophers of the Thirteenth Century : phi- 
losophy is the handmaiden of theology, but also a necessary 
introduction to  it. There  has always been an opposite sort  
of believer, who has felt that  his faith is somehow com- 
promised if it leans on intelligence. Defiantly he has  
scorned all proofs, as if to  reassert the solidity of his faith 
by rejecting all rational basis for  it. This  is the view of 
Tertullian : separate Jerusalem from Athens, the Church 
of Christ from the Academy of Plato. Wha t  are  proofs 
and arguments t o  me:  do  you say that what I believe is 
undemonstrable, that  it is absurd? Well, I believe it just 
because it is absurd, Credo quia absurdum est. This  type 
of mind is not exclusively Christian. You find it in Islam, 
in India. Here  is Al-Ghazzali of Bagdad, scornful of all 
philosophy in his reaffirmation of Mohammedan orthodoxy; 
here a re  immemorial Oriental mystics deeming the sur- 
render of intelligence a prerequisite of wisdom. N o t  fa r  
from here is also Duns Scotus, of Oxford, Doctor Subtilis, 
uprising against St. Thomas for  his reliance on the intellect. 
Will  is superior t o  intelligence, according t o  him, and the 
only ground of faith is divine revelation. T h e  arguments 
of reason are inconclusive in theology: you cannot prove 
God’s omnipotence nor the immortality of the soul. I n  all 
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his thinking Duns Scotus widens the breach between reason 
and religion, disclaiming any reliance on demonstration, 
firm and self-sufficient ,in his orthodox faith. 
But there is danger in this defiant faith, danger of results 
wholly unintended by its champions. Do you disdain in 
your religion to  rely on reason; would you separate theology 
from philosophy and science? Well  enough: you remain, 
then, wholly devoted to  your faith by fiat: your religion 
cannot be proved and does not have to  be proved. But 
after you come others who take you at  your word, that 
religion does not admit of proof, but who, unlike you, are 
mainly interested in what has t o  be and can be proved. 
They leave you to  your undemonstrable faith and they go 
their own secular way. So it is that Duns Scotus, arch- 
believer himself, became a factor in the disintegration 
of belief which marked the collapse of Scholasticism and 
the beginnings of the scientific Renaissance. 
Pascal likewise tells us that we know nothing and can 
prove nothing about the fundamentals of religion. W e  
cannot know what God’s nature is, nor even whether there 
is a God a t  all. Faith lacks rational ground; to  the intel- 
lect of man, the Gospel of Christ is as St. Paul said it was 
to  the Greek, folly. T o  all this, the modern unbeliever 
nods approval: he has made his own anthology of passages 
from Pascal, and what Pascal has said on this score no ,one 
can say better. But when Pascal invites him to  play heads 
or  tails on God and Christ, the unbeliever declines. No 
gambler, he ;  he would stick to  what admits of proof. Pas- 
cal may convince us that it is a fa r  better bargain all around 
to  wager on heads rather than on tails; he has not con- 
vinced us that heads have any advantage over tails, nor 
has he gained the man who is not impressed by the stakes, 
or who simply will not gamble. 
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For  consider: the whole force of Pascal’s wager as an 
argument for  Christian faith is t o  be found in the immense 
disparity between the stakes for and against God. W h a t  
decides Pascal’s wager is the prospect of heaven or  hell. 
But what warrants our judgment that, if there is a God, 
he has eternal heavenly bliss or else hell everlasting in 
store for  us? Do we really know any more about this 
than we know whether God exists a t  all? T r u e  enough, 
you may either wager or not wager:  there is here no third 
alternative, and Pascal insists that  wager you must. But 
why is he so sure of the number of his alternatives, and 
of the stakes involved? Do we have just two alternatives: 
heads or tails? Pascal’s geometrical bias has betrayed him 
where it should have served to  sustain. T h e  number of 
available alternatives may vary with each wager. Heads  
or tails, if you are  flipping a coin; but any one of six chances 
if you throw a die, o r  one in thirty-six if you throw a pair 
of dice. So a number may be either equal or not equal t o  
another number; but whether you prefer the one to  the 
other may depend on a different chance, whether it be equal 
or greater or  less. If in the cases mentioned the number 
of alternatives is fixed-2, 3, 6, 36-the situation becomes 
increasingly more complex as we approach more serious 
issues. Logic should keep us vigilant here lest we stray 
through incomplete disjunction. Perhaps we may say : 
Newton is either correct or incorrect. But can we say: 
either Newton or Einstein? N o  more now than before 
Einstein: to-morrow a third alternative may be available for 
us. W h o  can say once for  all in how many respects New- 
ton may be wrong, or Einstein? Tru th  is one, but error 
is manifold. Can we say: either Plato or  Aristotle, either 
St. Thomas or  Duns Scotus, either Calvin or  Molina? Still 
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less can we split things in morals: is every one of us either 
a saint o r  a sinner? 
So here we must go back with Pascal t o  his wager and 
reexamine the throws and the stakes. Assuredly the man 
who denies God’s existence is either right or wrong, and 
likewise the man who affirms God’s existence is either 
right or  wrong. W e  may grant t o  Pascal that  whether 
either be right o r  wrong cannot be determined by reason; 
that  is not the point now, but rather this : what is affirmed or  
denied when God’s existence or  non-existence is affirmed o r  
denied? A m  I to  believe in God’s grace with Augustine or 
with Molina? These are different views of God’s grace, 
and in a measure different beliefs in God. Pascal has re- 
duced his alternatives to  two: heads or tails, either Jan- 
senist Catholicism o r  atheism. If you could equate belief 
in God with Jansenist Catholicism, then you have your 
stakes, eternal bliss in Heaven or hell everlasting, and then 
you may perhaps continue with Pascal’s wager. 
But surely other alternatives are  available. You may 
believe in God and yet just because of your supreme confi- 
dence in his infinite love reject hell everlasting altogether; 
you may be a pantheist and long for  reabsorption into 
the Infinite; you may be a Buddhist and look forward to  the 
blessed selfless peace of Nirvana. Personal immortality 
may to  you be a priceless boon and may decide you to  stake 
your life on the side that would assure your soul of a here- 
a f te r ;  but you may have learned to  look beyond the indi- 
vidual self, and with the Positivist seek survival in Human- 
i ty;  or,  again, you may share the craving for  personal ex- 
tinction which characterizes a certain type of Oriental. If 
immortality is for  you a nightmare and for  me a cherished 
hope, your dread may lead you to  gamble on materialistic 
atheism as my hope may lead me to  gamble along with 
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Pascal. Wi th  every shade of religious opinion a new set 
of stakes emerges and we have really a new wager. 
T o  insist on the wager in Pascal’s terms is t o  mix con- 
siderable bigotry with our scepticism. It is remarkable 
that a mind like Pascal, believing itself so hopelessly igno- 
rant about God, should yet have felt so familiar about the 
operations of Divine Providence in case any Divine Provi- 
dence obtained. If it has come to  flipping coins over God, 
if our reason is really incapable of knowing God’s nature 
or even God’s existence, then how can we say that,  if God 
exists, H e  will deal thus and so with us? If you are  dog- 
matic in your estimate of God’s nature and sceptical about 
God’s very existence, then you will have to  flip a coin 
about it. But i f  you disclaim familiarity with the workings 
of a possibly existent Divlne Providence, then you cannot 
list the stakes of your wager, then you do  not know your 
alternatives, then you have no wager a t  all. 
D o  you, then, resign yourself utterly to  withering scep- 
ticism? Let  us see. T h e  defiance of faith in Pascal’s wager 
is dismal: face to  face with possible irremediable ruin, yet 
altogether in the dark ;  forced to  stake all blindly on a throw 
of destiny! If there be any such Divine Providence, ready 
to  damn us forever for  not believing in Him whom through 
no fault of ours we cannot know, then this idea would 
indeed be food for  pessimists; here would be a real nursery 
of irreligion. Morever,  if we are condemned to  incertitude, 
to  wagers and possibilities, is not the casuistry of the Jesuit, 
af ter  all, acceptable and sound? There  is a disquieting 
similarity between the doctrine which Pascal combats in 
the Provinciales and the advice which he gives to  the un- 
believer, t o  stultify himself, if need be, by attending mass 
and taking holy water. Well  does Saisset declare: “To 
replace certitude by probability, to  appeal t o  interest instead 
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of appealing to  religion and t o  the heart, t o  make a machine 
of yourself, t o  stultify yourself, these are the detestable 
procedures which compromised the name of the Society 
of Jesus”. 
There is a Pascal who, committed to  eternal truth and 
finding this truth in Jansenism, attacked with heroic dog- 
matism the protean hosts of casuistry. There  is another 
Pascal, the prey of general scepticism, who, doubting all 
yet unwilling to  let go of his Jansenist faith, resorted to  
flipping coins to  retain his hold on his God. These two 
Pascals are one, and reveal a most baffling genuis. Pascal 
seems to  counsel us thus: proceed confidently with geom- 
etry in the realm of the finite, relying on the certainty of 
science ; recognize, however, that all your finite certainties 
float in the ocean of infinite doubt; nevertheless yield your- 
self humbly to  the call of faith, stake your life on the 
possible truth of Christianity. 
I s  this sensible? Surely it is blighting to  reason. There  
is deeper wisdom in Pascal’s amazing treasury of thought. 
H e  is communing with the Saviour: “Be comforted,” the 
Saviour says to  him, “you would not seek me, had you not 
found me. I was thinking of you in my agony; I have shed 
such drops of blood for you. . . . Your conversion is my 
own concern; fear not and pray with confidence as if fo r  
me”. H e r e  is the most poignant and the most profound 
note in Pascal: poignant in the white-heat phrase : “I have 
shed such drops of blood f o r  you!” profound and luminous 
in the initial immortal words : “You would not seek me had 
you not found me”. The  soul groping in the dark marshes of 
doubt pushes on and refuses to  sink back. I n  thus pushing 
on and refusing to  sink back, in holding its course ever 
solidly ahead, it is itself proof eternal that  there is solid 
ground ever ahead. I s  God’s truth done and finished and 
Pascal’s Despair of Reason 21 1 
stored away on divine pantry-shelves beyond our reach; is 
it done and dead and laid out under divine seals which we 
may never break? Or is it not rather ever in the making? 
Is God himself the unreadable Preface of the book of 
creation, or is he not himself the living careering heart of the 
book, ever to  be sought and found, yet never encased in 
a formula : the infinite, eternal, ever-present Beyond? 
A deal of religious perplexity is due to  our trying to  
think of God as if H e  were a reality external t o  us and 
to  our hunger and thirst af ter  him. But, like the reality of 
all values, may not the reality of the Divine be in the 
divine quest itself? T h e  logical judgment expresses logical 
value ; scientific thought, the search after knowledge and 
truth, is itself knowledge, insight, truth. Poetic activity, 
the pursuit of beauty, is itself the supreme manifestation of 
beauty. T h e  indubitable evidence of the reality of moral 
value is our 0w.n endeavor after it. I n  science is T r u t h ;  
in a r t  is Beauty; in goodness is Good;  in godliness is God. 
T h e  ancient Hindu who conceived of the supreme Brahman 
as the divine worshipful urge which created all that  there 
is, showed profound insight into the nature of spiritual 
reality. “You would not seek me, had you not found me. 
. . . Your conversion is my own concern; fear not and 
pray with confidence as if for me.” 
H o w  can man love God, how can he know God whom 
he has not seen except he love and know his brother whom 
he has seen? H o w  can we reach the greater truth except 
through the lesser? Each truth that turns out to  be also 
false, every good that  we find to  be also evil, is, not a sign of 
our impotence and ignorance, but of our strength and wis- 
dom. I n  the striving after truth, beauty, good, God, in 
the reach after eternal values, man attains unto the only 
real eternity there is, the eternity of the ideal. Only in the 
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higher light is the lower light disclosed as dimness; only 
the larger good renders the lesser good evil. “When I was 
a child,” St. Paul tells us, “I spake as  a child, I felt as a 
child, I thought as a child,”-and quite rightly; but, he 
goes on, ‘(now that I am become a man, I have put away 
childish things.” Only he might have said: “As I become a 
man, I am putting away childish things”, for  the full man- 
hood of the spirit is ever b e h g  attained. 
Here  Pascal’s own career, tragic as it is in its misery and 
in its grandeur, is a living symbol of the truth before us. 
W h a t  can be more crushing than this “tragedy of a power- 
ful and energetic spirit in an imbecile body”, prematurely 
burnt out and disintegrating in constant anguish? I t  is the 
rude jest of frail flesh at  the expense of the spirit. And 
the spirit of Pascal: what a tragic vortex it is of spiritual 
integrity and heroism, halting distrust, anguished contrari- 
ety, sophistry, stultifying bigotry, reckless hazard, and 
headlong surrender ! But hear the high note that is sounded 
in this life of Pascal, a note all the clearer, the more 
heroic because it sounds from the dark depths of despond. 
It is a luminous shaft  of light that  ascends from the abyss of 
human misery to  the divine heights of truth, the heights 
of aspiring intelligence. Read a page that my friend Albert 
Gui rard  calls the noblest in French prose : 
“Man is but a reed, the weakest in Nature;  but he is a 
thinking reed. It is not necessary that  the whole universe 
should a rm itself in order t o  crush him. A vapor, a drop 
of water, would be sufficient to  kill him. But even though 
the universe should crush him, man would still be nobler 
than that  which is killing him, for he knows that he is 
dying, and the advantage that  the universe has over him. 
T h e  universe does not know. 
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“All our dignity therefore lies in our thought. It is 
upon that that  we must depend, not upon space and time 
which we cannot fill. Le t  us therefore strive to  think well: 
such is the foundation of moral life.” 
